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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
OOUGLAS L. ROBINSON and 
\ 
I NELDA HJ. ROBINSON, Plaintiffs and Respondents, CASE 
vs. NO. 10337 
PAUL SINGLETON HREINSON, 
\ Defendant and AppeUant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
A personal injury action brought by Nelda H. Robin-
son and an action for loss of property and consortium by 
her husband, Douglas L. Robinson. 
DISPOSITION IN WWER COURT 
Plaintiffs recovered a jury verdict as indicated in ap-. 
pellant's brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Contrary to appellant's assertion that the facts are 
immaterial, it is felt that they are orf great significance. 
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The defendant struck the rear of a vehicle in which 
plaintiff, Nelda H. Robinson, wlas riding as a passenger. 
Defendant admitted liability at the time of trial. As a re-
sult of injuries, Mrs. Robinson, the mother of five small 
children, all under ten years of age, was hospitalized on 
three separate occasions; one for the purpose of taking a 
myelogram test. Considerable pain and numbness was 
caused by her injuries, all of which had a most disruptive 
effect upon her, and her husband's personal life. 
In the face of these facts and the admitted liability of 
defendant, Mr. Midgley stated that Mrs. Robinson was not 
injured and was merely trying to "cash in" by suing (Tr. 
8). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED 
BY ANY TESTIMONY REGARDING INSURANCE. 
Mrs. Robinson's reference to insurance is accurately 
quoted in appellant's brief. Following such statement the 
defendanit's attorney, in chambers, moved for a mistrial 
and Judge Tuckett denied such motion by stating (Tr. 90): 
"Well, the motion will be denied for the reason that 
no one's insurance was mentioned. It may have re-
ferred to the plaintiff's insurance." 
(Underlining provided) 
It is not denied that defendant was insured. Defend-
ant had admitted liability and, further, that plaintiffs had 
other insurance (Tr. 91). Thus, such statement was not 
prejudicial as borne out by the following authorities: 
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In 4 A.L.R. 2d 784 it is held that "Irresponsive or in-
advertent answer referring to insurance is not ground for 
mistrial." Nrunerous cases are cited, including: 
Hatchimonji v. Homes, 38 Ariz. 535, 3 P.2d 271. 
Hughes v. Quackenbush, 1 Cal. App. 2d 349, 37 P.2d 99. 
Also, 4 A.L.R. 2d 819, Sec. 22. Doubt as to whose in-
surance is referred to: 
"Where a reference to insurance leaves it in doubt as 
to whether it is liability insurance which is referred 
to or some other type of insurance, and where it is 
uncertain whether it is plaintiff's or defendant's in-
surance about which reference has been made, the 
courts are inclined to regard the reference to insur-
ance as relatively harmless." 
Several cases are cited, in all of which insurance has 
been interjected but is held to be harmless. 
Pruett v. Marshall, 46 Cal. App. 2d 169, 115 P. 2d 507; 
Coker v. Moose, 180 Okla. 234, 68 P. 2d 504. 
Fixico v. Harmon, 180 Okla. 412, 70 P. 2d 114. 
In this same annotation, Sec. 21, in the case of White 
v. Makela, 304 Mich. 425, 8 NW 2d 123: 
"It was held that trial court properly denied a motioo 
for the declaration of a mistrial because plaintiff, on 
his direct examination, said that one of the defend-
ants had said that everything would be taken care 
of because he was covered by insurance, where the 
question of defendant's liability was reasonably clear 
and the amount of the verdict was not excessive." 
Also see 4 A.L.R. 2d 764: 
"In view of the fact that most automobile owners now 
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carry liability insurance covering operation of their 
automobiles, the probability of prejudice resulting in 
the minds of the jury from some suggestion that the 
defendant in an automobile accident case carried lia-
bility insurance does not seem so real as it formerly 
did. While the courts still are careful to prevent un-
warranted injection of the liability insurance fador. 
the more recent cases indicate less of a tendency to 
regard error in this regard as beyond cure by pro-
per action of the trial judge." 
Also, 4 A.L.R. 2d 766, which states: "In Texas, how-
ever, the courts have held without an enabling statute that 
the insurer may be joined ,as a proper party." Louisiana 
and Wisconsin have statutes expressly permitting the join-
der of the insurer. 
See 5 Am. Jur. 855, Sec. 967: 
"Moreover, it is to be observed generally that in view 
of the present almost universal custom among automo-
bile owners of protecting themselves from liability for 
damages resulting from negligence in the operation of 
their automobile by procuring liability· insurance, and 
of the general knowledge of jurors of the prevalence 
of such a custom, it is probable that evidence suggest-
ing that defendant is insured is not as prejudicial to 
the right of a defendant to a fair and impartial trial 
as heretofore." 
Thus, in Moinz v. Bettencourt, 24 Cal. App. 2d 718, 76 
P.2d 535, it was said: 
"That while attorneys might not deliberately drag in 
the fact that defendants were protected by an insur-
ance company, it was very generally known in these 
days to every person of understanding that most own-
ers and operators of automobiles were protected by 
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some form of insurance, and particularly conunon 
carriers operating large trucks upon the highways, and 
that therefore questions and answers referring to in-
surance carriage by defendant could not have made 
any difference in the final outcome of the case or any 
amount that the jury awarded." 
The case at hand is distinguishable from the cases 
cited by appellant. For example, the case of Hill v. Clow-
ard, 14 Utah 2d 55, 377 P. 2d 186, the defendant was spe-
cifically asked by the Court why he didn't bring his truck 
so that it could be viewed and the defendant stated in re-
sponse that he didn't have any insurance or license on it. 
It is true that no inunediate objection was made to this 
evidence, but it is interestng to note that the reference to 
insurance was specifically directed toward the defendant's 
vehicle and in that case the Supreme Court sustained the 
verdict. 
In the case of Gittens v. Lundberg, 3 Utah 2d 392, 284 
P. 2d 1115, the court did hold, as stated in the appellant's 
brief, that generally speaking, reference to insurance for 
purpose of getting it before the jury is prajudicial. How-
ever, they noted that when such reference as this is so 
interwoven in an admission against interest that it is im-
practical to exclude it without destroying or impairing the 
benefit of the admission, the statement is not error. 
In the instant case, I am sure that the plaintiff, Mrs. 
Robinson, made the statement inadvertently and since she 
made no specific reference to the insurance of the defend-
ant, it is respectfully submitted that such testimony was 
not prejudicial. 
Counsel :for appellant cites an excerpt from the case 
of Belle v. Smith (1932) 81 Utah 179, 17 P. 2d 224. How-
ever, a careful reading of this case clearly indicates it to 
be precedent in behalf of the respondent. In that case the 
counsel for plaintiff, in voir direing the jury, the follow-
ing record of the proceedings was cited in the case: 
Q. (by Mr. Hanson, counsel for plaintiff). 
"Are you acquainted in any way with what is 
known as Intermountain Lloyds Company? 
Mr. Stewart {counsel for defendant): At this time 
we take exception to the reference made by counsel 
and assign it as misconduct, and we ask the court at 
this time to discharge the jury and call a new venire. 
Court: I will sustain the objection. I think there 
should be no reference made to that company, and I 
will admonish you, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, 
to disregard the reference to the company just ref erred 
to. 
Mr. Hanson: I am going to make a record of this, 
and I have the authorities on it; I am going to dictate 
it into the record now. 
Mr. Stewart: Just a moment. If your Honor please, 
we will ask that the jury be excused. 
Court: The company is not a defendant in any sense. 
Mr. Hanson: I know it is not, but it is the party in 
interest. That is the test, your Honor. 
Mr. Stewart: We will ask that the jury be excused 
during any discussion on this matter." 
The jury was then excused and proof was presented to 
show that the defendant did, in fact, carry Intermountain 
Lloyds insurance. Following this proffer of proof the coun-
sel for the defense, along with his client, testified that they 
were in the hallway and could clearly overhear this testi-
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mony and since they were in the presence of other jurors, 
assumed that they also heard the presentment of these 
facts. In the face of all this evidence the court held, on 
page 194: 
"There is nothing to indicate bad faith on the part of 
counsel or to show a willful, persistent or diligent 
course or effort to impress upon the jury the fact that 
defendant's liability was insured. We are satisfied the 
jury's verdict was not prejudiced by such remark." 
Thus, we have a case in which the jury, at the time 
of voir dire, was, in effect, advised by counsel for plaintiff 
that the true party in interest was the insurance company 
ref erred to in their question of the prospective juror and 
yet the court refused to grant a mistrial and such ruling 
was sustained. 
In the case of Reid, et al, v. Owens, et al, 98 Utah 50, 
93 P. 2d 680, the court again held that the admission of 
insurance upon the part of the defendant was not reversble 
eITor When such admission was interwoven with other 
relevant evidence. In that case evidence from the de-
ceased's widow was: 
Q. "Now will you state what Mr. Owens said? 
A. Mr. Owens said, 'My boy is careless, and he drives 
too fast and it worries us.' He said 'We have taken out 
insurance to protect him,' and he says, 'If you won't 
prosecute our boy, we will do all we can to help you 
get the $5,000.00 insurance.' " 
It is recognized that this type of admission of cover-
age is distinguishable from the case at hand, but it is in-
teresting to note the general attitude of our courts in hold-
ing that such statement, when interwoven with admissible 
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evidence, is not reversible error. The court further states, 
on page 60 of this case: 
"If questions are propounded to a witness for the ob-
vious purpose of revealing such irrelevant fact to the 
jury (the presence of insurance) , a mistrial may prop-
erly be declared or a new trial granted." 
In the case under appeal the reference to insurance on 
the part of the plaintiff wlas most inadvertent and in the 
eyes of the respondent did nort in any way prejudice ,fue 
result. 
POINT II 
THE TESTIMONY OF DOCTOR WAYNE M. HEB-
ERTSON WAS PROPERLY ADI\tIITI'ED AND THE IN-
STRUCTION REGARDING FUWRE MEJDiICAL TREAT-
MENT WAS PROPER. 
Defendant's reference in his brief to the testimony of 
Dr. Hebertson is accurate. This was to the effect that 
plaintiff, Mrs. Robinson, had suffered a severe strain of 
the neck ,and spine and radiculitis of the nerve roots of 
the neck and, further, may have suffered a herniated disc 
(Tr. 57). He further testified X-rays do not always ~ 
veal an injury to the spine (Tr. 61) and surgery is often 
performed with no objective showing in the X-ray (Tr. 
62). 
Dr. Hebertson was then asked (Tr. 63) : 
Q. "Does this lead you, doctor, to the opinion as to 
a probability that Mrs. Robinson will continue to have 
some complaint or pain without stabalizing surgery?" 
The doctor then answered that it probably would be 
required (Tr. 64). 
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Q. "Do you have an opinion, sir, as to any reasonable 
degree of certainty whether surgery will be required 
in the case of Mrs. Robinson? 
A. I think it will if she is to e~ improvement in 
her condition." 
Costs of such procedure were then testified to (Tr. 67). 
This court has ruled clearly upon this subject in Moore 
v. D & R G W Co., 4 Utah 2d 255, 292 P. 2d 849. 
"This court has long recognized that the mere use of 
words such as 'belief', 'impression', 'probability', or 
'possibility' will not exclude a witness' testimony where 
his expression does not indicate a lack of personal ob-
servation, but merely the degree of positiveness of his 
original observation of the facts or the degree of posi-
tiveness of his recollection; Jackson v. Harries, 65 
Utah 282, 236 P. 234; Picino v. Utah-Apex Mining Co., 
52 Utah 338, 173 P. 900; Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 102 Utah 26, 126 P. 2d 1070; and further 
that the words must be taken within the context of 
the testimony in determining the meaning and value 
of the evidence; J()IJles v. California Packing Corp., 
Utah, 244 P. 2d 640. Likewise, this court has ap-
proved the giving of an instruction allowing the jury 
to assess damages for such results of the defendant's 
wrong as plaintiff will probably suffer in the future. 
Picino v. Utah-Apex Mining Co. supra; Kirchgestner 
v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 118 Utah 20, 218 P. 2d 
685. Respondent argues that the liberal policy thus 
adopted by this court is an express repudiation of the 
doctrine of torts that recovery may be had for such 
injurious consequences only as are reasonably cer-
tain. It is, hoWlever, clear from a reading of all cases 
cited supra that the plaintiff retains his burden of 
proving his damages by competent evidence to an 
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extent where the trier of the fact might discover that 
which is probably true, having regard for the cer-
tainty or uncertainty which is more or less inherent 
in every issue of fact." 
Thus, the admission of such evidence and the instruc-
tion given were in accord with well established law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HEBER GRANT IVINS 
Attorney for Respondents 
